

Children of the Mind
and
the Concept of Edge and Center Nations

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Abstract

Orson Scott Card and his Ender Series have had a profound impact on the genre of contemporary science fiction, meriting an academic analysis of some of his more theoretical ideas. I have chosen to analyze his concept of “Center” and “Edge” nations found in *Xenocide* and *Children of the Mind* through the lens of international relations, sociological, and political theory, in order to bring nuance to an underdeveloped theory that many non-academics may be familiar with. Ultimately, we must conclude that Card’s concept of “Center” and “Edge” nations is too stagnant and does not account for social and hegemonic change, which influences the justifications of why these “nations” may be considered “Center” in the first place.

Keywords: Orson Scott Card; Children of the Mind; Ender’s Game; Edge and Center Nations; Isomorphism; Centripetal and Centrifugal; Hegemony; Nationhood.

Introduction

Xenocide and *Children of the Mind* are set apart from the rest of Orson Scott Card’s *Ender Series* due to their contemplative tone. This makes these final two texts prime for philosophical analysis, when compared to texts such as *Ender’s Game*. In particular, Card has provided an interesting and important concept for contemplation in his last book *Children of the Mind*: the existence of “Edge” and “Center” nations.

In this work, Card discusses Ender’s final mission—to relocate several species of aliens found on the planet Lusitania, including the “buggers” he wiped out in the beginning of the book series (in *Ender’s Game*, 1997), and protect them from an interplanetary government bent on destroying them. This “Starways Congress” consists of the entirety of humanity’s colonized planets, which is organized by nation and culture. For example, the planet Lusitania was almost entirely colonized by Brazilians. Thus, intercultural exchanges between “Edge and Center” colonial planets factor into the Starways Congress’s decision to destroy the planet Lusitania, and Ender must scramble with the help of friends to find a way to stop it.

The purpose of this paper, then, is to discuss Card's ideal types of Edge and Center nations, while paying attention to historical cases that could nuance his typology. Ultimately, we must conclude that Card's cultural treatment of Edge and Center nations is too stagnant to account for historical change, which should inform faithful readers moving forward.

Card's Edge/Center Nation Dichotomy and Isomorphism

Card, in the context of Ender's final story, clearly spent time debating and examining the Edge/Center concept when analyzing the state of "nations," as he conceives it within the context of planetary colonization. In Card's mind there are both "Center" nations and "Edge" nations. Definitionally, "Center nations" are those that swallow up other cultures within their own and are usually a consistent entity. They rarely expand outward, as they see themselves as the epitome of civilization—with a substantial lack of self-doubt. "Edge nations," on the other hand, are those nations that grow up in the shadow of the Center nations. They, according to Card, either overextend themselves in hyper aggression or supplicate themselves to Center influence;

Center People are not afraid of losing their identity. They take it for granted that all people want to be like them, that they are the highest civilization and all else is poor imitation or transient mistakes. The arrogance, oddly enough, leads to a simple humility—they do not strut or brag or throw their weight around because they have no need to prove their superiority. They transform only gradually, and only by pretending that they are not changing at all.

Edge People, on the other hand, know that they are not the highest civilization. Sometimes they raid and steal and stay to rule—Vikings, Mongols, Turks, Arabs—and sometimes they go through radical transformations in order to compete—Greeks, Romans, Japanese—and sometimes they simply remain shamed backwaters. But when they are on the rise, they are insufferable because they are unsure of their worth and must therefore brag and show off and prove themselves again and again—until at last they feel themselves to be a Center People. Unfortunately, that very complacency destroys them, because they are not Center People and feeling doesn't make it so. Triumphant Edge People don't endure, like Egypt or China, they fade, as the Arabs did, and the Turks, and the Vikings, and the Mongols after their victories.

The Japanese have made themselves permanent Edge People. (Card in his "Afterword" to *Children of The Mind*, 1996)

Given the serious nature of his afterword and his integration of these ideas throughout both *Xenocide* and *Children of the Mind*, readers should take this passage as Card's thoughts on the matter. Countless examples of a reference to this Edge/Center dichotomy can be found throughout his work. This one is a passage pulled from a discussion between Wang-mu, a citizen of the Chinese-settled world Path, who seeks to convince the "necessarian" philosopher Hikari, from the Japanese-settled Divine Wind, of the importance of the distinction between Center and Edge cultures.

"Then I will enlighten you," said Wang-mu, discarding the game of humility. "For I see Japan as an Edge nation, and I cannot yet see whether your ideas will make Japan a new Center nation, or begin the decay that all Edge nations experience when they take power."

"I grasp a hundred possible meanings, most of them surely true of my people, for your term 'Edge nation,'" said Hikari. "But what is a Center nation, and how can a people become one?"

"I am not well-versed in Earth history," said Wang-mu, "but as I studied what little I know, it seemed to me that there were a handful of Center nations, which had a culture so strong that they swallowed up all conquerors. Egypt was one, and China. Each one became unified and then expanded no more than necessary to protect their borders and pacify their hinterland. Each one took in its conquerors and swallowed them up for thousands of years. Egyptian writing and Chinese writing persisted with only stylistic modifications, so that the past remained present for those who could read . . . a Center nation can keep its cultural power long after it has lost political control. Mesopotamia was continually conquered by its neighbors, and yet each conqueror in turn was more changed by Mesopotamia than Mesopotamia was changed. The kings of Assyria and Chaldea and Persia were almost indistinguishable after they had once tasted the culture of the land between the rivers." (Card 1996, 88-89)

The core consistency that could be derived from Card's assertions, but which Card is unaware of, is the existence of a radial and "Centered" force of power emanated by a centrifugal organization that determines a variety of different hegemonies. Centripetal organizations are spun around this, creating "Edge" nations and peoples that seek to become centrifugal. These terms are largely borrowed from the "new institutionalism" literature in organizational ecology theory (see Hannan and Freeman 1977 for an introduction to the organizational field; Meyer and Rowan 1977, DiMaggio and Powell 1983, and Greenwood and Hinings 1996 for the hallmarks of new institutionalism literature). The centripetal groups seek to emulate the centrifugal to maintain survivability, and the centrifugal emanates a hegemonic power that enforces this process into organizational isomorphism.

This theory operates largely on the assumption that there are a finite number of resources that organizations could compete over, and that organizations that are "fitter" tend to monopolize these resources (examples would include membership, money, buildings, etc.). "Fit" is determined by whether or not the organization is competitive in acquiring these resources—thus, hegemonic actors tend to monopolize resources while smaller organizations choose to model themselves after the dominant institution. While institutionalism literature is not often applied to state actors, we could argue that nations are institutions that operate much like lower-level voluntary organizations, and are influenced by global hegemony and domination, much like voluntary organizations are influenced by national bureaucracies.

Card himself believes he comes from a “Center nation” in America, but subscribes to what he considers an “Edge” identity in Mormonism. He also speaks quite harshly on American popular culture, which we will see later. But the usage of “Center” and “Edge” is not carefully interrogated by Card himself, and so we must take his usage at face value.

The inevitable hindrance is that Card does not seem to incorporate into his writing the logic of isomorphism, although his writing seems to be grasping for it. Isomorphism refers to the way in which organizations mirror themselves in rationalization, narrative construction, organizational form, and power structure—particularly in the case of weaker or smaller organizations modeling themselves after hegemonic examples. Moving thus from Card’s usage, we shall begin unpacking the underlining assumptions within his concepts and addressing them, while adding centrifugal, centripetal, and isomorphic descriptors to improve upon his ideas—because they do have merit.

Nations as Culture

When using the term “nation,” Card seems to conflate national identity with cultural identification and reproduction. This is demonstrated often throughout his work when discussing the various cultures of settled planets and how they impact the individual’s personality and identity. For example, Wang-mu of the Chinese Path is an ardent rule-and-order follower, Hikari of Japanese Divine Wind is steeped in samurai philosophy, citizens of Scandinavian Trondheim are weathered, hardened, and thoughtful, and citizens of the Samoan Pacifica are laid back and adopt the island culture.

One could claim that Card’s definition of “nation” is more focused on the notion of “statehood,” involving an abstract sense of continuity with the legitimate sovereign use of violence within a specific geographic area. This type of thinking only evolved after the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, which established religious peace in the Holy Roman Empire and defined modern statehood as the sovereign right of a nation to use “legitimate” force against its own citizenry (Croxtton 1999). Thus, this focus on the lawful use of coercive power is insufficient when discussing the “continuity” of specific nations—which Card certainly wants to do. His definition, then, largely hinges on cultural identification.

An individual’s perceived cultural identification has become particularly salient in contemporary identarian discourse. This is not, however as Card assumes, synonymous with national identity—which is typically derived through discursive and symbolic regulation by the state apparatus, ethnic affiliation, and hegemonic application to the individual. There is often a symbiotic relationship between the two, but there is certainly a distinction that must be reasonably drawn and discussed.

Indeed, national identities of the 19th and 20th centuries were typically formed based on ethnic parameters,¹ such as language, social practices, and norms. Some historical examples of these mechanisms at play are the formation of Italy and Germany as states, and the dissolution of the Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian Empires along linguistic and ethnic parameters. These aspects of nationality and ethnicity obviously needed individuals to reproduce them, and social agreement to replicate them. Through multiple subjective individual agreements, ethnic and thus national identities were formed intersubjectively,

as a common identifier. Common political action was essential to form these parameters, and the individual sovereign was immeasurably important to this process, inspired by the collapse of the *Ancien Régime*. These movements did not simply develop out of thin air, no—they developed from enlightenment ideas of individual sovereignty, individual and collective action, and intersubjective verification of norm regulation.

We can see from my above argument that Card's notion of nationhood is perfunctory at best, then, condensing a complicated concept. His hasty and oversimplified understanding of nationhood does not probe meaningfully into the many continuous discursive processes associated with national identity construction. Several theorists have gotten further into the details of this evolutionary process. Some focus on "collective memory" and on how a collectivity can contain similar shared experiences and thus narrativity, such as Halbwachs (1992). Many theorists discuss how nation-states form, largely through the use of common language as an identifier—and this is a conversation I prefer, perhaps because I subscribe to Foucault's dynamic of power/knowledge and language/knowledge/power.²

Benedict Anderson and his "imagined communities" (1994, 89) comes to mind immediately—where his overall argument is that readers of local dialects became able to interact and achieve discourse during the advent of mass vernacular print.³ Thus, according to Anderson, the first European nations were formed around national print languages.

Hobsbawm relates that the evolution of nation-forming traditions were often deliberately created in response to social need. Thus, "invented tradition" is often used by the ruling class to control the masses. Furthermore, and more to the point of nation-states, institutions use invented tradition to maintain collective identity and unity in the face of social dynamism (Hobsbawm 1984).

Renan, however, argues that the nation is a collectivity of individuals with a shared common past and a social cohesion. This collectivity only maintains itself if it has a strong bond guaranteed by an agreement based on mutual consent. Ultimately, he maintains that people should not look towards the differences we have in race, language, religion, or location, but should rather look for common experiences (Renan 1995, 143).

So we must look again at Card's blanket term "nation." I interpret Card's designation as one of a mutual social cohesion and intersubjective verification and identification, typically defined through language, self-identification (as I believe it is the simplest litmus test we can make, for culture determinacy and influence over the individual, to self-identify through external regulation linguistically⁴), and tradition that has elements of isomorphism. As Durkheim (1915) likely believed, every society needs a sense of continuity with the past to form individual identity and social life. So ultimately Card must not mean "nation" as in "nation state"; he means cultural identity determined through social cohesion, linguistic association, and tradition. These designations later lead to greater association with and formation of larger collective entities such as nation states and their associated hegemonic narrativities and civic identity.⁵

On Center and Edge Nations

With a definition and an analysis of Card's "nation" aside, we can now start to discuss the validity of his claims. Are there truly "Center" and "Edge" nations? What, if any, would they be?

I will start with a discussion of some of Card's examples—China, Egypt, Babylon, etc. All of these ancient civilizations have fallen and been reincarnated in alternative iterations. It is true that in many of the cases (specifically early Babylon, Hyksos invaders of Egypt, many nomadic invasions of China) these "Edge peoples" chose to settle down and adopt the culture of the conquered. But we must remember that specific cases of this kind are always tied to context. One regional power may be dominated by another, and decline is always a threat for centrifugal organizations (or "de-Centeredness"). Thus, we must wrestle with the idea that "Center" or centrifugal nations can lose their Center status for countless reasons and *have* many times over the years. Few of Card's examples can explain the constantly shifting and nuanced nature of historical processes.

China came later to its place as a Center nation, but it has been astonishingly successful. It was a long and bloody road to unity, but once achieved that unity remained, culturally if not politically. The rulers of China, like the rulers of Egypt, reached out to control the hinterland, but, again like Egypt, rarely attempted and never succeeded in establishing long-term rule over genuinely foreign nations. (Card 1996)

There have been countless dynasties ruling in China over the long duration of its claim of singular cultural identity, and all or many of them did not constitute the same geographical holding, which Card assumes. Egypt, as another example, added Nubia later in its existence, which was culturally quite different, an example being the worship of a different ancestral pantheon. What is foreign? What is the hinterland? Card seems to be hinting at centrifugal and centripetal processes of discursive cultural hegemony through geographic understandings.

But clearly geography is not a good indication of where centrifugal/Center status lies. Although it might contribute to the possibility of becoming a Center—as in the case of the impact of rivers or geographic borders, such as deserts and mountains, in society formation—it does not suggest a unity of peoples. Therefore, as Card's interpretation relies on cultural identification, we should focus on it.

Culture changes. With each individual invasion things change, groups are assimilated, discourse surrounding ethnicity is redefined. Currently there are many individuals in China who are not considered "Han," but they still consider themselves Chinese. So clearly this is not the direct defining parameter of Center status. It seems to me that Card tries to appeal to an abstract sense of "civilization." "Civilization" in this case means a composite of relative stability, peace, technological advance, and development. The term "civilization" itself, however, is implicated in ethnocentric claims that lack rigor—making it a poor measure of any example of "Edge" or "Centeredness."

This is where I especially take issue with Card's examples of "Edge" nations. Can we really say that the Islamic Golden Age was brought about by an "Edge People"? Further, if we accept the Arab people as a Center nation, as is likely accurate especially during the Middle Ages, we must accept that Europeans were at most an "Edge people," due to their warlike and comparatively "uncivilized" state. During the Middle Ages, the Arab Golden Age kept countless works of western philosophy such as Plato and Aristotle alive, trigonometry was taught, etc. Meanwhile, in Europe, petty lords were fighting for scraps of land until the Carolingian Renaissance. It is clear that Europe was, at this time, centripetal relative to the centrifugal forces of the Islamic Empires and was modeling itself on the scientific/philosophic discoveries of the Islamic Golden Age.

How did the Europeans, then, become a "Center" people in the mind of Card? This is the importance of civil evolution. Edge nations are developing. Center nations emanate centrifugal force on the periphery and are benefitting from development, most likely derived from peace and stability. Peace and stability are generated from a functioning civil society and a hegemonic power structure that enforces the rule of law. We could even say that it is derived from strength in moral order, as Durkheim (1979) claims. While Center nations no doubt continue to develop, they feel less of a need due to a perceived sense of achievement, condescension, and a lack of self-doubt.

Once peace and stability set in, decadence associated with hegemony comes with it. Without challenges from the periphery for centrifugal dominance, nothing checks the lack of self-doubt and complacency sets in. Many of these centripetal nomadic "Edge peoples" bring new vigor to the once degrading "Center nations," revitalize it and give it purpose by seizing the original centrifugal hegemony with centripetal (outside) vigor. War commonly brings about technological ingenuity. Plagued by war, technological advances were made to respond, giving European nations an advantage over some (but not all) groups. Thus, Europe only stumbled into its centrifugal hegemony through the conquest of the New World.

Is *that* the path to the Center? Through conquest? Card derides this as an Edge characteristic, but clearly it is not—it is the only discernable way we can identify the strength of one fighting collectivity over another (Schmitt 1976). War typically happens when there is a significant amount of surplus population (Thayer 2009), indicating relative peace and stability or technological advance, most often both. Are these conquering nations the Center? If so, when do they gain their "Centeredness"? I believe this takes place when a nation has developed to such a point that it maintains a centrifugal sphere of influence. *This* is when hegemonic discourse arrives, and the process of cultural isomorphism begins on the "Edge" to conform to the institutions of the centrifugal collectivity. After this process begins, the surrounding areas are either incorporated into the nation formally through war or whatever method or given culturally feudatory status.

According to Card's definition, the United States that he touts as a Center Nation is actually an Edge nation (although if we accept my centrifugal isomorphism theory, then the U.S. would likely be "Center"). This is because of our unceasing desire to stabilize the world for western interests. Card, in his ideotype, has to deal with the likelihood of settlement by Edge peoples in Center nations creating and maintaining "Center" status, and Center

nations often going to war for spheres of influence. Ultimately, I will agree with Card that there are important centrifugal nations that attract outside avarice and settlement. But to think that these “Center nations” are not determined by context, inconsistency, or prone to loss of status is folly.

The United States—Center or Edge?

“America was settled by Edge peoples, but the idea of America became the new invigorating principle that made it a Center nation. They were so arrogant that, except for subduing their own hinterland, they had no will to empire. They simply assumed that all nations wanted to be like them. They swallowed up all other cultures. Even on Divine Wind, what is the language of the schools? It was not England that imposed this language, Stark, Starways Common Speech, on us all... “The idea of America became the Center idea, I think,” said Wang-mu. “Every nation from then on had to have the forms of democracy. We are governed by the Starways Congress even now. We all live within the American culture whether we like it or not.” (Card 1996)

I also speculated about America, which was composed of refugees from the Edge, but which nevertheless behaved like a Center nation, controlling (brutally) its hinterland, but only briefly flirting with empire, content instead to be the Center of the world. America had, for a time at least, the same arrogance as the Chinese—the assumption that the rest of the world wants to be like us. (Card 1996)

Card privileges the United States in that he thinks of it as a Center Nation, although from above we can see that his definitions on conquest contradict this belief. As the birth-child of major European powers, how could the United States maintain a “Center” status? Is it geography, culture, military/sphere of influence capabilities? Perhaps it is the way in which the United States assimilates groups into its overall identity through discursive isomorphism. This would mean that the culture of the United States is Center and the many immigrants it takes in in waves are “Edge Peoples.”

One could also make the argument that the United States is not a Center nation at all, but an Edge one. Purposefully enforcing its hegemony on the world after World War II, it is easy to make the argument that as an “Edge people” the United States has taken itself to violent action and aggressive posturing. Perhaps we will see an explosive level of violence (as Card discusses in the context of the rising Japanese Empire of the 20th century) from this “Edge Nation” as the United States is pressed more in its claim to hegemony from challenges from “Center nations” such as China. Recent populist, isolationist, fascist, and protectionist movements across the West may even prove this point—that the whole West has only been a long standing “Edge People” prone to radical violence and belligerence.

But this would completely deny the possibility of Western hegemony, which the U.S. inherited from Europe, ever being a “Center” which, when factoring in spheres of influence and centrifugal force (or how coercive the system of hegemonic isomorphism is on centripetal organizations) we must reject outright. It is clear that western, specifically U.S. democratic idealism has managed to institute collective isomorphism at a supra-national level—a point we will return to with the United Nations case.

A brief digression into United States subculture might be appropriate, as Card feels it as such, especially on the topic of Mormonism.

I am a part of an “Edge” culture which “accepts” and “discharges” ideas from the dominant culture and which is in danger of losing its self-centering impulse. I speak of Mormon culture, which was born at the Edge of America and which has long been more American than Mormon. Supposedly “serious” literature in Mormon culture has consisted entirely of imitations, mostly pathetic but occasionally of decent quality, of the “serious” literature of contemporary America, which is itself a decadent, derivative, and hopelessly irrelevant literature, having no audience that believes in or cares about its stories, no audience capable of genuine community transformation. (Card 1996)

Mormonism, also known as the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, is a unique offshoot of American Protestantism that is most certainly on the “Edge” or centripetal force within mainstream American Protestant society, but with some strong caveats. Latter-day Saints are not, for example, an “Edge people” in Utah, where the majority of Latter-day Saints can be found. Strong social welfare policy can therefore be found in the Utah state government, thereby making Mormonism in the state of Utah a “Center” group. Perhaps we can consider this a case of centrifugal isomorphism being applied effectively onto the Latter-day Saints group.

What about the United Nations?

So, can the United Nations even be considered in this context of “Center” and “Edge” nations? Naturally, the United Nations invites all persons regardless of status into its mandate. But does this make it a “Center” or “Edge” nation, if we could even regard it as either?

After World War II, the West had the opportunity to enshrine neoliberal democratic values through the United Nations. The isomorphic capabilities of the centrifugal “core,” i.e., the Western powers,⁶ were imposed upon the rest of the centripetal world through a representative system that was modeled after western incarnations of democracy. This would mean that the UN is simply a byproduct of a centrifugal hegemonic system.

A universal appeal to all peoples would imply an absolute integrative capability. This would thus lead us to assume that the United Nations must be a “Center” nation if we could call it that at all (Renan’s interpretation would likely be the most helpful in this context: that the nation is a collectivity of individuals with a shared common past and a social cohesion). Those who are most active in the United Nations are the centrifugal “Permanent Five” members of the Security Council, who essentially dominate the United Nations’ ability to act and violate state sovereignty when in agreement. Nations outside this council have little choice other than to voice their concerns as rotating non-voting members of the Security Council, or in the General Assembly. Additionally, these nations cohere into regional intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) such as NATO, the European Union, the African Union, Association of Southeast Asian Nations, League of Arab States, etc. in order to gain a larger platform in voting blocs within the General Assembly. So, would the United Nations be considered a “nation” completely comprised of “Edge peoples,” those

who must prove themselves to and supersede the power of the dominant Permanent Five? The United Nations is currently the best avenue a centripetal nation may have to receive agency within the global neoliberal centrifugal order—but this agency would only be gained by conformity through institutional isomorphism within the UN’s model of governance.

Ideally, one could argue that the integrative capability of the UN transcends national borders, and thus forms its own “international” culture that supersedes the nation. If we were to use Card’s cultural and linguistic implication of nationhood, then, theoretically the UN could be conceived of as a Center nation. This idea falls short, however, when keeping in mind the conformity to the linguistic expectations of the UN, which only has six official languages: Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian, and Spanish. Furthermore, international culture is largely dominated by the discourse of a select few hegemonic states, often through the lens of American popular culture (see Ritzer’s “McDonaldization Thesis” [1999]) and democratic idealism, which would make it difficult for the UN to assert its Centeredness in an entirely detached way from national hegemonic power and discourse.

It would be unlikely, given these understandings, that the United Nations would ever seek to assert its own sovereignty as a centrifugal force—or even a nationhood. It currently acts as a proxy for the hegemonic isomorphic power of the Permanent Five. Card discusses at length how an international organization managed to govern the world through the *Shadow of the Hegemon*, but as it stands right now the United Nations has no authority to overcome the P5 except for the rare exception of the Right to Protect Commitment, which allows for military intervention within any country under humanitarian crisis conditions. If the United Nations chooses to start using the Right to Protect as a means of intervening militarily in multiple nations (similar to how Peter Wiggin asserted his power in *Shadow of the Hegemon*), perhaps we can start to see the United Nations as a true “Edge Nation” in Card’s dichotomy. But one must understand that this is extremely unlikely, as the Permanent Five on the Security Council have little reason to start allowing this type of action, and the majority of funding for the United Nations comes from these nations, or those within their sphere of influence. There is also little reason for the UN to take on this antagonistic role towards the centrifugal hegemony that it models itself after and functions to maintain.

Conclusion

Ultimately, we must remark to Card that there will always be centrifugal centers of power and development—it shifts location, it changes, but ultimately the processes of power and hegemony change little. Card grasps at the forces of isomorphism in a variety of proposed ways—“nationhood,” culture, conquest and war, but ultimately centrifugal force maintained through hegemonic imposition determines what Card labels “Center” and “Edge.” It must be concluded that as interesting as Card’s ideas on “Center” and “Edge” nations are, centrifugal forces shift and are by no means eternal or rooted in a “Center” nation, as tempting as it may be to claim for many scholars of historical comparison.

These conclusions have implications for Card's epistemology, and thus for fans of his worldbuilding. From his focus on political matters in *Children of the Mind*, *Xenocide*, and his *Shadow* series, those who read Card have received a rather inflexible typology of nationhood. Calling this oversight into question is imperative, as readers may have never questioned the feasibility of Card's ideals surrounding galactic colonization and world hegemony. After all, what is the role of science fiction but a projection and interrogation of the future molded in the past?



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Notes

¹ "...a modern democratic state demands a 'people' with a strong collective identity. Democracy obliges us to show much more solidarity and much more commitment to one another in our joint political project than was demanded by the hierarchical and authoritarian societies of yesteryear. In the good old days of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, the Polish peasant in Galicia could be altogether oblivious of the Hungarian country squire, the bourgeoisie of Prague, or the Viennese worker without this in the slightest threatening the stability of the state. On the contrary. This condition of things only becomes untenable when ideas about popular government start to circulate. This is the moment when subgroups, which will not, or cannot, be bound together, start to demand their own states. This is the era of nationalism, of the breakup of empires" (Charles Taylor: "Why We Need a Radical Redefinition of Secularism," 44).

² Perhaps even Chomsky's. Foucault would perhaps note here: "We must cease once and for all to describe the effects of power in negative terms: it 'excludes,' it 'represses,' it 'censors,' it 'abstracts,' it 'masks,' it 'conceals.' In fact power produces; it produces reality; it produces domains of objects and rituals of truth. The individual and the knowledge that may be gained of him belong to this production." Found in *Discipline and Punish*, 194.

³ There was a reason why the Catholic Church insisted on using and monopolizing Latin as the international language, until finally being ousted by the regional dialects. I would argue in other essays that this use of Latin was a large key to the Papal international hegemony and the formation of common collective European identity. "In the Middle Ages, the Catholic Church fought against the use of the vernacular and for the preservation of Latin as the 'universal' language, since this was a key element in its own intellectual hegemony." *Selections from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci*, 326.

⁴ See Foucault and Wittgenstein.

⁵ Card is clearly looking at culture, not the direct nation state. This is highlighted especially in his discussion of Mormonism in the United States, which I will discuss more at length later in this essay.

⁶ See literature on international development for explanations of "core" and "periphery" status.

